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Windows user-mode rootkit

r77 Rootkit: Userland Hiding on Windows and Offline Checks

r77, the open-source ring 3 Windows rootkit used by miners and loaders: $77 names, registry-stored stagers, tasks and services, and why offline checks see it.

Kind
Windows user-mode rootkit · Userland layer
Platforms
Windows
First seen
2017
Status
In the wild
Also known as
r77
Checked by
None: no module reads its traces

Overview

r77 is an open-source, user-mode ("ring 3") rootkit for Windows, published on GitHub under the MIT licence; the repository dates from December 2017 and was still maintained in 2026. Its README describes it as fileless, with an installer and persistence, and lists what it hides: files and directories, processes and their CPU usage, registry keys and values, services, TCP and UDP connections, named pipes and scheduled tasks. By default, anything whose name starts with $77 is hidden.

Being public, it turns up as a component of other people's malware. Reported uses include:

  • Cryptomining. Elastic Security Labs documented a 2023 campaign in several Asian countries that used r77 to hide an XMRig miner, a remote administration tool and a rogue local administrator account. Elastic did not attribute it and noted that the reliance on open-source tools may be meant to obscure attribution.
  • Fake CAPTCHA and fake software lures. Securonix's OBSCURE#BAT report (March 2025) describes a modified r77 that hides names starting with $nya- instead, delivered through batch files, mainly to English-speaking victims. The operators are unknown.
  • A software supply-chain compromise. Gen Digital reported that trojanized JDownloader installers, served from the project's own website between 6 and 7 May 2026, deployed r77 components together with a bot and a Code Integrity policy that blocks antivirus programs.

Because the code is public, an r77 finding identifies a tool, not an actor.

How it loads and hides

r77 is not a kernel rootkit. It never loads a driver; it hides things by changing what Windows APIs return inside each running process. At the level a responder needs, the reports describe these pieces:

  1. Installer and stager. The installer stores a stager executable in the registry, under HKLM\SOFTWARE\$77stager in Elastic's and Gen Digital's cases, and arranges for PowerShell to load it from there at startup. Elastic saw a scheduled task run as SYSTEM at boot; Gen Digital also saw a service named $77svc; Securonix saw a hidden scheduled task. The payload lives in the registry, not as an executable file, which is what "fileless" means here.
  2. AMSI tampering. The PowerShell step patches the Antimalware Scan Interface in its own process so that the loaded code is not scanned (Elastic, Gen Digital, Securonix).
  3. Service process. In Elastic's sample, the stager runs the next module inside a hollowed dllhost.exe whose parent is spoofed as winlogon.exe; that module records its state under HKLM\SOFTWARE\$77config.
  4. Injection everywhere. That process injects the rootkit DLL into every running process, apart from an exclusion list, and catches new processes as they start.
  5. Hooks. Inside each process, the DLL hooks functions that list processes, files, registry keys, services and network connections (Elastic names NtQuerySystemInformation, NtQueryDirectoryFile, NtEnumerateKey, NtEnumerateValueKey, EnumServicesStatusExW and NtDeviceIoControlFile, among others) and removes matching entries from their results.

The consequence for responders: anything that asks Windows from inside an injected process (Explorer, Task Manager, tasklist, reg query, PowerShell) may be lied to. The data itself is untouched on disk. A tool that reads the registry hive files, the file system or the task XML files directly, or the same disk mounted on another machine, sees everything.

Traces on disk

LocationWhatSource
HKLM\SOFTWARE\$77stagerStager stored in the registryElastic, Gen Digital
HKLM\SOFTWARE\$77config (subkeys such as pid, with values svc32 / svc64)Runtime configuration; its permissions let any user write to it, per the READMEElastic, GitHub README
HKLM\SOFTWARE\$77dll32, $77dll64Rootkit DLLs stored in the registryGen Digital
Service $77svcPersistence independent of the registry stagerGen Digital
A scheduled task that runs PowerShell at startup as SYSTEMLoads the stagerElastic
C:\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\SIPolicy.p7bCode Integrity policy blocking about 50 security executables after rebootGen Digital
HKLM\SOFTWARE\$nya-config, $nya-dll32, $nya-dll64The same layout with the $nya- prefixSecuronix
C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$nya-qX6Pb164Hidden logon task with highest privilegesSecuronix
C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\ACPIx86.sys, service ACPIx86Driver-named file and service; Securonix found no active kernel driverSecuronix
HKLM\SOFTWARE\OOhhhm; user Environment value onimaiucEncrypted PowerShell payload and its launcherSecuronix

Named pipes such as $77childproc64 and the hidden prefix itself are useful search terms in memory and in telemetry. Hashes, domains and addresses are in the reports; copy them from there.

How to check a host

Offline is the reliable view, because r77's hiding stops at the running Windows instance:

  • Load the SOFTWARE and SYSTEM hives in a registry viewer on another machine and search key and value names for $77 and any other repeated prefix, and for large binary values directly under HKLM\SOFTWARE.
  • In the SYSTEM hive, list services and look for $-prefixed or random names, and services whose command line starts PowerShell.
  • Read every file under C:\Windows\System32\Tasks and look for tasks that start PowerShell with an encoded command, run at boot or logon as SYSTEM, or are marked hidden.
  • Check for C:\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\SIPolicy.p7b that your organisation did not deploy.
  • In the file system, list names starting with $77 or another unusual prefix.

Live, use the difference between views. Commands such as these run inside processes that r77 may have injected, so an empty result proves nothing, while a mismatch with the offline view is strong evidence:

Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Actions.Execute -match 'powershell' } | Select-Object TaskPath, TaskName
Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty PSChildName
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName = 'Security'; Id = 4698 } -MaxEvents 50
autorunsc64.exe -accepteula -a * -c -h -s > autoruns.csv

Security event 4698 (a scheduled task was created) and Sysmon process and registry events are worth collecting: r77 filters what programs list, and Securonix notes that Sysmon may still log processes the rootkit hides. The scheduled tasks technique page and the registry hives artifact page cover offline parsing of both. More on what offline checks can and cannot prove is in offline rootkit check limits.

What the checker looks for

None of the checker's modules covers r77's traces, so checks is empty for this family. r77 lives in the SOFTWARE hive, scheduled tasks and user-mode memory, while the modules read the boot chain (esp, measuredboot, bootsector), Linux kernels (linuxkernel) and Windows kernel drivers (windrivers).

Two edge cases. The windrivers module reads the SYSTEM hive offline and lists driver services, so a variant that registers a driver-named service, such as ACPIx86 in OBSCURE#BAT, appears in its list if the service has a driver type; if ACPIx86.sys is a PE file without a signature, it raises "An unsigned kernel driver". That flags the variant's extra file, not r77's hiding. A WDAC policy file like Gen Digital's is outside its scope. For r77 itself, use a persistence parser on the registry hives and task files, such as the Windows Persistence tool.

Removal and recovery

  1. Collect first: the registry hives, C:\Windows\System32\Tasks, the event logs and a memory image if possible.
  2. Identify every persistence point offline: the stager value, configuration keys, tasks, services and any Code Integrity policy. The project ships an uninstaller and Securonix mentions it for cleanup, but on a host where a modified copy ran, you cannot be sure it removes the variant's additions.
  3. Gen Digital's advice for the JDownloader case applies generally: treat the system as compromised and reinstall Windows, since partial cleanup is unreliable.
  4. Deal with what r77 was hiding. It is a concealment layer for a miner, a RAT or a bot; that payload, the accounts it created and the data it reached are the real incident. Change passwords from a clean device.
  5. If a SIPolicy.p7b was planted, remove it and reboot so that security products can start again.

Sources

Primary public reports, newest first.

  1. 2026-05-11Inside the JDownloader Supply-Chain Attack: An r77 Rootkit Bot That Kills Your AntivirusGen Digital
  2. 2025-03-13Analyzing OBSCURE#BAT: Threat Actors Lure Victims into Executing Malicious Batch Scripts to Deploy Stealthy RootkitsSecuronix
  3. 2023-05-22Elastic Security Labs steps through the r77 rootkitElastic
  4. 2017-12-17r77-rootkit (public repository)GitHub

See also

Related families