Linux LKM rootkit
Syslogk LKM Rootkit: Traces and Offline Checks
Syslogk is an Adore-ng-based Linux kernel rootkit that hides a Rekoobe backdoor started by magic packets. Its traces, network signs, host checks and recovery.
- Kind
- Linux LKM rootkit · Kernel layer
- Platforms
- Linux
- First seen
- 2022
- Status
- In the wild
- Checked by
- Linux kernel
Overview
Syslogk is a Linux kernel module rootkit that Avast (now Gen Digital) described in June 2022. Avast found it "in the wild, apparently under development". It is heavily based on Adore-ng, the old open-source rootkit. Avast named it after its control file, /proc/syslogk.
Its job is to hide a backdoor, Rekoobe, and start it only when told to:
- Rekoobe poses as an SMTP server, and Avast traces its code to the open-source TinySHell.
- The rootkit keeps Rekoobe hidden and launches it when a crafted TCP packet arrives.
- Avast believes one actor developed both and meant them to run together. It does not name that actor.
The analysed module's version magic is 2.6.32-696.23.1.el6.x86_64, a CentOS 6 kernel. Avast loaded it on CentOS 6.10 without forcing.
In September 2026, AhnLab ASEC published detection and removal guidance for Syslogk. It describes a sample that differs from Avast's:
- it hides names containing
was-patch; - it hides a process named
was_sys_relaywith its parent and children; - it removes itself from
/sys/moduleas well as from the module list.
ASEC's article is tagged Larva-25010 but does not discuss attribution or victims. The family therefore exists in more than one build. Rely on behaviour more than on any single string.
How it loads and hides
Neither report says how the module is loaded at boot. Treat every module load configuration and every script that calls insmod or modprobe as a candidate.
| Behaviour | Avast's sample (2022) | ASEC's sample (2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Module hiding | Unlinked from the module list with list_del; revealed when 1 is written to /proc/syslogk | Unlinked from the module list and its kobject removed from /sys/module |
| File hiding | VFS hooks hide /etc/rc-Zobk0jpi/PgSD93ql and any directory whose name contains -Zobk0jpi | The VFS readdir pointer is replaced to hide names containing was-patch |
| Process hiding | Hides the process PgSD93ql | Inline hook on proc_root_readdir hides was_sys_relay and its family |
| Socket hiding | Lines for chosen ports removed from the TCP IPv4 seq_show output (/proc/net/tcp) | Inline hook on tcp4_seq_show |
| Symbol lookup | Not detailed | Reads /proc/kallsyms for function addresses |
The backdoor trigger (Avast). The rootkit watches TCP traffic.
- A packet with source port
59318makes it run/bin/sh -c /etc/rc-Zobk0jpi/PgSD93ql, which starts Rekoobe. - A second packet stops it: source port in the range
63400to63411, TCP reserved field0x08, and the keyD9sd87JMaijin the data.
Rekoobe then waits as a fake SMTP server for a crafted STARTTLS exchange that opens a shell. Between triggers, nothing listens, which defeats port scans.
Hidden files stay reachable by full path. ASEC notes that you can still cd into a hidden directory.
Traces on disk
| Location | What | Source |
|---|---|---|
/etc/rc-Zobk0jpi/PgSD93ql | Rekoobe, the hidden payload (Avast sample) | Avast |
Any directory containing -Zobk0jpi | Hidden by the module | Avast |
Names containing was-patch | Hidden by ASEC's sample | ASEC |
A .ko whose vermagic is 2.6.32-696.23.1.el6.x86_64 | Avast's sample; a mismatch with the host's kernel folder also stands out | Avast |
Strings /proc/syslogk, PgSD93ql, -Zobk0jpi, D9sd87JMaij | In the module | Avast |
| Kernel log lines from loading an out-of-tree module | Wording depends on the kernel | Linux kernel |
| Firewall or flow logs: inbound TCP from source port 59318 or 63400–63411, then a session to a high port presenting as SMTP | Trigger and backdoor use | Avast |
Avast's IoC repository lists the Syslogk sample and about seventy Rekoobe hashes, and publishes its research tools. ASEC gives one MD5 without saying which file it belongs to.
How to check a host
Live, with caution. The module hides its files, process and ports from every program.
cat /proc/sys/kernel/tainted
ls -la /proc/syslogk 2>&1 # Avast's control file, if the default name was kept
ls -ld /etc/rc-Zobk0jpi 2>&1 # hidden from listings, but reachable by name
for m in /sys/module/*; do [ -e "$m/initstate" ] && ! grep -q "^${m##*/} " /proc/modules && echo "only in sysfs: ${m##*/}"; done
unhide brute proc # PIDs that exist but are missing from /proc listings
- The sysfs comparison can catch Avast's sample, which only unlinks itself from the module list. It cannot catch ASEC's, which removes its sysfs entry too.
- Do not write to
/proc/syslogkto reveal the module unless you have captured memory and decided to change the system's state. Avast's IoC repository provides its own research tools for analysts who need them. - For memory, Volatility 3's
linux.malware.hidden_modulesandlinux.malware.check_afinfolook for unlinked modules and for tampered/proc/nethandlers. Thetcp4_seq_showhook is that kind of tampering. See memory forensics.
Offline.
R=/mnt/evidence
find "$R" -xdev \( -name '*-Zobk0jpi*' -o -name '*was-patch*' -o -name 'PgSD93ql' \) 2>/dev/null
find "$R" -xdev -name '*.ko' -exec sh -c 'strings -a "$1" | grep -qE "/proc/syslogk|PgSD93ql|Zobk0jpi|D9sd87JMaij" && echo "$1"' _ {} \;
modinfo -F vermagic /path/to/suspect.ko
zgrep -hiE 'taint|module verification' "$R"/var/log/messages* "$R"/var/log/kern.log* 2>/dev/null
grep -rnE 'insmod|modprobe' "$R"/etc/rc.d "$R"/etc/rc.local "$R"/etc/init.d "$R"/etc/cron* "$R"/etc/systemd 2>/dev/null
- On the CentOS 6 family Avast targeted, kernel messages go to
/var/log/messages, and boot-time module scripts live in/etc/sysconfig/modules/. - Read network evidence for the trigger ports.
- The
stringsloop only reads uncompressed.kofiles. Decompress.ko.xzand.ko.zstmodules first if the kernel uses them.
What the checker looks for
The linuxkernel module can see:
- A module file under
lib/modules/: "Unsigned module among signed modules" when its neighbours are signed, and "Module unknown to the kernel build and to every package" whenmodules.orderdoes not list it and no dpkg package owns it; on an RPM-based host such as CentOS, ownership is not checked and the finding rests onmodules.order. If it was built for another kernel than the folder it sits in, it raises "Module built for another kernel": Avast's sample carries2.6.32-696.23.1.el6.x86_64. Hook-target names such astcp4_seq_showraise "Names kernel functions that rootkits hook"; strings such as/proc/kallsymsare listed among the module's notable strings, without a finding of their own. - Kernel log lines, when the kernel printed them and the collection includes
kern.logormessages: "Kernel log: out-of-tree module loaded", "Kernel log: unsigned module loaded", or "Kernel log: module built for another kernel refused" for a build that did not match. - A module hidden from
/proc/modulesfor builds like Avast's: "Loaded module missing from /proc/modules" from the collect script's_live/outputs.
It does not search for the -Zobk0jpi or was-patch names or the payload. It cannot see the network trigger. ASEC's build, hidden from both module views, is invisible to the _live comparison.
Removal and recovery
- Preserve memory and the disk. The module's hidden state and the trigger configuration are in memory. Keep firewall and flow logs that may show trigger packets and backdoor sessions.
- From the image, recover the module, the payload folder and whatever loads the module at boot. Check the payload against Avast's Rekoobe hashes. Identify every source address that sent trigger packets.
- Rebuild. A kernel module controlled the host's view, and a root shell could be opened at will. ASEC describes detection and remediation with its own product. For an incident, rebuilding from known-good media is the trustworthy route.
- Rotate credentials and keys stored on the host, and review the hosts it could reach.
- Harden.
- Move off end-of-life kernels such as CentOS 6's, which Avast's sample targets.
- Enforce module signatures.
- Block inbound traffic that no service needs: Rekoobe still has to accept the connection that follows the trigger.
Adore-ng explains the hiding design Syslogk inherited. Reptile uses a similar magic-packet backdoor.
Sources
Primary public reports, newest first.
- 2026-09-03Detection and Removal of the Syslogk Rootkit in a Linux EnvironmentAhnLab ASEC
- 2022-06-13Linux Threat Hunting: 'Syslogk' a kernel rootkit found under development in the wildGen Digital (Avast)
- 2022-06-13IoC for Syslogk Kernel Rootkit hiding RekoobeAvast (GitHub)
See also
Related families
- Adore-ngLinux LKM rootkit
- ReptileLinux LKM rootkit
- DiamorphineLinux LKM rootkit