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Linux LKM rootkit

Syslogk LKM Rootkit: Traces and Offline Checks

Syslogk is an Adore-ng-based Linux kernel rootkit that hides a Rekoobe backdoor started by magic packets. Its traces, network signs, host checks and recovery.

Kind
Linux LKM rootkit · Kernel layer
Platforms
Linux
First seen
2022
Status
In the wild
Checked by
Linux kernel

Overview

Syslogk is a Linux kernel module rootkit that Avast (now Gen Digital) described in June 2022. Avast found it "in the wild, apparently under development". It is heavily based on Adore-ng, the old open-source rootkit. Avast named it after its control file, /proc/syslogk.

Its job is to hide a backdoor, Rekoobe, and start it only when told to:

  • Rekoobe poses as an SMTP server, and Avast traces its code to the open-source TinySHell.
  • The rootkit keeps Rekoobe hidden and launches it when a crafted TCP packet arrives.
  • Avast believes one actor developed both and meant them to run together. It does not name that actor.

The analysed module's version magic is 2.6.32-696.23.1.el6.x86_64, a CentOS 6 kernel. Avast loaded it on CentOS 6.10 without forcing.

In September 2026, AhnLab ASEC published detection and removal guidance for Syslogk. It describes a sample that differs from Avast's:

  • it hides names containing was-patch;
  • it hides a process named was_sys_relay with its parent and children;
  • it removes itself from /sys/module as well as from the module list.

ASEC's article is tagged Larva-25010 but does not discuss attribution or victims. The family therefore exists in more than one build. Rely on behaviour more than on any single string.

How it loads and hides

Neither report says how the module is loaded at boot. Treat every module load configuration and every script that calls insmod or modprobe as a candidate.

BehaviourAvast's sample (2022)ASEC's sample (2026)
Module hidingUnlinked from the module list with list_del; revealed when 1 is written to /proc/syslogkUnlinked from the module list and its kobject removed from /sys/module
File hidingVFS hooks hide /etc/rc-Zobk0jpi/PgSD93ql and any directory whose name contains -Zobk0jpiThe VFS readdir pointer is replaced to hide names containing was-patch
Process hidingHides the process PgSD93qlInline hook on proc_root_readdir hides was_sys_relay and its family
Socket hidingLines for chosen ports removed from the TCP IPv4 seq_show output (/proc/net/tcp)Inline hook on tcp4_seq_show
Symbol lookupNot detailedReads /proc/kallsyms for function addresses

The backdoor trigger (Avast). The rootkit watches TCP traffic.

  • A packet with source port 59318 makes it run /bin/sh -c /etc/rc-Zobk0jpi/PgSD93ql, which starts Rekoobe.
  • A second packet stops it: source port in the range 63400 to 63411, TCP reserved field 0x08, and the key D9sd87JMaij in the data.

Rekoobe then waits as a fake SMTP server for a crafted STARTTLS exchange that opens a shell. Between triggers, nothing listens, which defeats port scans.

Hidden files stay reachable by full path. ASEC notes that you can still cd into a hidden directory.

Traces on disk

LocationWhatSource
/etc/rc-Zobk0jpi/PgSD93qlRekoobe, the hidden payload (Avast sample)Avast
Any directory containing -Zobk0jpiHidden by the moduleAvast
Names containing was-patchHidden by ASEC's sampleASEC
A .ko whose vermagic is 2.6.32-696.23.1.el6.x86_64Avast's sample; a mismatch with the host's kernel folder also stands outAvast
Strings /proc/syslogk, PgSD93ql, -Zobk0jpi, D9sd87JMaijIn the moduleAvast
Kernel log lines from loading an out-of-tree moduleWording depends on the kernelLinux kernel
Firewall or flow logs: inbound TCP from source port 59318 or 63400–63411, then a session to a high port presenting as SMTPTrigger and backdoor useAvast

Avast's IoC repository lists the Syslogk sample and about seventy Rekoobe hashes, and publishes its research tools. ASEC gives one MD5 without saying which file it belongs to.

How to check a host

Live, with caution. The module hides its files, process and ports from every program.

cat /proc/sys/kernel/tainted
ls -la /proc/syslogk 2>&1                       # Avast's control file, if the default name was kept
ls -ld /etc/rc-Zobk0jpi 2>&1                    # hidden from listings, but reachable by name
for m in /sys/module/*; do [ -e "$m/initstate" ] && ! grep -q "^${m##*/} " /proc/modules && echo "only in sysfs: ${m##*/}"; done
unhide brute proc                               # PIDs that exist but are missing from /proc listings
  • The sysfs comparison can catch Avast's sample, which only unlinks itself from the module list. It cannot catch ASEC's, which removes its sysfs entry too.
  • Do not write to /proc/syslogk to reveal the module unless you have captured memory and decided to change the system's state. Avast's IoC repository provides its own research tools for analysts who need them.
  • For memory, Volatility 3's linux.malware.hidden_modules and linux.malware.check_afinfo look for unlinked modules and for tampered /proc/net handlers. The tcp4_seq_show hook is that kind of tampering. See memory forensics.

Offline.

R=/mnt/evidence
find "$R" -xdev \( -name '*-Zobk0jpi*' -o -name '*was-patch*' -o -name 'PgSD93ql' \) 2>/dev/null
find "$R" -xdev -name '*.ko' -exec sh -c 'strings -a "$1" | grep -qE "/proc/syslogk|PgSD93ql|Zobk0jpi|D9sd87JMaij" && echo "$1"' _ {} \;
modinfo -F vermagic /path/to/suspect.ko
zgrep -hiE 'taint|module verification' "$R"/var/log/messages* "$R"/var/log/kern.log* 2>/dev/null
grep -rnE 'insmod|modprobe' "$R"/etc/rc.d "$R"/etc/rc.local "$R"/etc/init.d "$R"/etc/cron* "$R"/etc/systemd 2>/dev/null
  • On the CentOS 6 family Avast targeted, kernel messages go to /var/log/messages, and boot-time module scripts live in /etc/sysconfig/modules/.
  • Read network evidence for the trigger ports.
  • The strings loop only reads uncompressed .ko files. Decompress .ko.xz and .ko.zst modules first if the kernel uses them.

What the checker looks for

The linuxkernel module can see:

  • A module file under lib/modules/: "Unsigned module among signed modules" when its neighbours are signed, and "Module unknown to the kernel build and to every package" when modules.order does not list it and no dpkg package owns it; on an RPM-based host such as CentOS, ownership is not checked and the finding rests on modules.order. If it was built for another kernel than the folder it sits in, it raises "Module built for another kernel": Avast's sample carries 2.6.32-696.23.1.el6.x86_64. Hook-target names such as tcp4_seq_show raise "Names kernel functions that rootkits hook"; strings such as /proc/kallsyms are listed among the module's notable strings, without a finding of their own.
  • Kernel log lines, when the kernel printed them and the collection includes kern.log or messages: "Kernel log: out-of-tree module loaded", "Kernel log: unsigned module loaded", or "Kernel log: module built for another kernel refused" for a build that did not match.
  • A module hidden from /proc/modules for builds like Avast's: "Loaded module missing from /proc/modules" from the collect script's _live/ outputs.

It does not search for the -Zobk0jpi or was-patch names or the payload. It cannot see the network trigger. ASEC's build, hidden from both module views, is invisible to the _live comparison.

Removal and recovery

  1. Preserve memory and the disk. The module's hidden state and the trigger configuration are in memory. Keep firewall and flow logs that may show trigger packets and backdoor sessions.
  2. From the image, recover the module, the payload folder and whatever loads the module at boot. Check the payload against Avast's Rekoobe hashes. Identify every source address that sent trigger packets.
  3. Rebuild. A kernel module controlled the host's view, and a root shell could be opened at will. ASEC describes detection and remediation with its own product. For an incident, rebuilding from known-good media is the trustworthy route.
  4. Rotate credentials and keys stored on the host, and review the hosts it could reach.
  5. Harden.
    • Move off end-of-life kernels such as CentOS 6's, which Avast's sample targets.
    • Enforce module signatures.
    • Block inbound traffic that no service needs: Rekoobe still has to accept the connection that follows the trigger.

Adore-ng explains the hiding design Syslogk inherited. Reptile uses a similar magic-packet backdoor.

Sources

Primary public reports, newest first.

  1. 2026-09-03Detection and Removal of the Syslogk Rootkit in a Linux EnvironmentAhnLab ASEC
  2. 2022-06-13Linux Threat Hunting: 'Syslogk' a kernel rootkit found under development in the wildGen Digital (Avast)
  3. 2022-06-13IoC for Syslogk Kernel Rootkit hiding RekoobeAvast (GitHub)

See also

Related families