Skip to content

Windows kernel rootkit

FudModule: Lazarus Data-Only Rootkit, BYOVD and Zero-Days

FudModule, the data-only Windows rootkit attributed to Lazarus: BYOVD with Dell and ENE drivers, then appid.sys and AFD.sys zero-days, its traces, how to check.

Kind
Windows kernel rootkit · Kernel layer
Platforms
Windows
First seen
2021
Status
In the wild
Also known as
FudModule.dll
Checked by
Windows drivers

Overview

FudModule is a Windows rootkit that blinds security tools by changing kernel data, without loading a kernel driver of its own. ESET and AhnLab described the first versions in September 2022; Avast and Gen Digital followed the later ones in 2024.

Attribution, as each source states it:

  • ESET attributes the autumn 2021 attacks in which it found FudModule (against an aerospace employee in the Netherlands and a political journalist in Belgium) to Lazarus with high confidence.
  • AhnLab attributes the 2022 attack it analysed to the Lazarus group.
  • Avast and Gen Digital attribute the 2023 and 2024 variants to Lazarus.
  • Microsoft tracks FudModule with Diamond Sleet since October 2021, and saw it delivered in August 2024 by a North Korean actor it links to Citrine Sleet with medium confidence; it says the two actors may share the tool.

The family is notable for the way it reached the kernel, which moved from bringing a vulnerable driver to exploiting drivers that ship with Windows. It matters to responders because the later versions leave almost nothing on disk.

How it loads and hides

FudModule is "data-only": it runs in a user-mode process and, once it has a way to read and write kernel memory, edits kernel structures directly. No rootkit driver is loaded, so driver signing never comes into play for the rootkit itself. The way it obtains kernel read and write access changed over time:

PeriodSource of kernel accessReported by
Autumn 2021dbutil_2_3.sys, a legitimate Dell driver vulnerable to CVE-2021-21551 (BYOVD); ESET calls this the first recorded in-the-wild abuse of that CVEESET
Early 2022ene.sys, a legitimate ENE Technology driver built on an old open-source I/O library (BYOVD)AhnLab
2023 to February 2024CVE-2024-21338, a zero-day in appid.sys, the AppLocker driver, in code present since Windows 10 1703; fixed on 13 February 2024Avast, Microsoft
2024CVE-2024-38193, a use-after-free in AFD.sys, the WinSock driver; fixed on 13 August 2024Gen Digital, Microsoft
August 2024CVE-2024-38106 in the Windows kernel, reached after a Chromium exploit (CVE-2024-7971); FudModule loaded into memoryMicrosoft

BYOVD versus a built-in driver. In the first two rows, the attacker brought a signed, legitimate but vulnerable driver onto the host and registered it as a service, which needs administrative rights and leaves a driver file, a service key and a load event. Microsoft's vulnerable driver blocklist and EDR products look for exactly that. Avast explains the later move to zero-days in drivers that Windows already ships as a way to avoid those traces: nothing has to be dropped or loaded, and the attack becomes close to fileless. Avast notes that its exploit may cause appid.sys to be loaded if it is not already running.

What it disables. The reports list the kernel mechanisms FudModule tampers with:

  • registry, object, process, thread and image-load callbacks that security products register;
  • file system minifilters of security products, unlinked by name or altitude;
  • Event Tracing for Windows loggers and providers (about 95 provider GUIDs in the 2024 variant);
  • Windows Filtering Platform callouts, conditionally;
  • image verification callbacks (in the February 2024 variant; removed in the next);
  • Prefetch file creation (AhnLab) and crash dumps (Gen Digital, version 3);
  • protection of specific security processes, which it suspends or strips of protected status: Microsoft Defender (MsMpEng.exe, MsSense.exe), CrowdStrike Falcon, HitmanPro and AhnLab V3 are named.

Version 3 also injects code into services.exe and msiexec.exe and acts as a loader for a further payload. Because the rootkit's changes are made to kernel memory and the reports describe no persistence of its own, they last until the next reboot; persistence belongs to the loader or backdoor that runs it.

Traces on disk

LocationWhatSource
DBUtil_2_3.sys, dropped by FudModule.dllVulnerable Dell driver used for kernel access in 2021ESET
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<name>, Start = 0Boot-start service for the vulnerable driver, per ESET's ATT&CK mapping; no name publishedESET
ene.sysVulnerable ENE Technology driver used in 2022AhnLab
tem1245.tmp (folder not stated)Status file recording which techniques succeededAvast
C:\Windows\System32\drivers\appid.sys, AFD.sysGenuine Windows drivers that were exploited; they are not modified and are not indicatorsAvast, Gen Digital
Missing Prefetch files, crash dumps or ETW events for the periodSide effects of the disabled mechanismsAhnLab, Gen Digital, Avast

The 2024 variants are delivered and run in memory. Avast publishes YARA rules for them in its public IOC repository; hashes are in the cited reports.

How to check a host

Offline, for the BYOVD-era variants:

  • In the SYSTEM hive, list kernel driver services and look for hardware utility drivers (Dell BIOS utility, ENE RGB or I/O drivers) on machines that do not need them, especially with Start 0. Compare the file names and hashes with Microsoft's recommended driver block rules and the LOLDrivers list.
  • Check Amcache and the System log (7045) for when such a driver first appeared, and Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational for loads the blocklist refused.

For the zero-day variants, the evidence is mostly elsewhere:

  • confirm the February and August 2024 updates are installed; an unpatched host was exposed to CVE-2024-21338 and CVE-2024-38193;
  • look for gaps: security products whose processes stopped or lost protection, telemetry that went silent, Prefetch that stops being written, crash dumps that should exist and do not;
  • search for tem1245.tmp across the file system timeline;
  • review how the loader arrived: the intrusions reported alongside FudModule began with Amazon-themed spear-phishing documents (ESET) and, in 2024, a browser exploit (Microsoft).
Get-HotFix | Sort-Object InstalledOn | Select-Object -Last 20
Get-CimInstance Win32_SystemDriver | Where-Object StartMode -eq 'Boot' | Select-Object Name, PathName
Get-ChildItem C:\ -Recurse -Force -Filter tem1245.tmp -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational' -MaxEvents 200

A memory image is the only direct way to see the tampering itself: removed callbacks, unlinked minifilters, disabled ETW sessions. Acquire it before rebooting. The BYOVD hunting guide covers the driver side in detail, and the kernel drivers artifact page lists the related logs.

What the checker looks for

The windrivers module sees the BYOVD-era traces:

  • a vulnerable hardware utility driver such as dbutil_2_3.sys or ene.sys. LOLDrivers lists both names as vulnerable drivers, so a file whose hash matches one of its samples raises "A known vulnerable driver (LOLDrivers)" with the entry's name. Its service is listed with its start type, path and key write time, and a path in a writable folder is flagged;
  • the driver's signer, which is the legitimate vendor: the finding rests on the hash match and the context, not on a bad signature;
  • with the logs, "A kernel driver service was installed" for a 7045 event, and the Code Integrity events it reads.

It cannot see the 2023 and 2024 variants. They exploit Windows' own appid.sys and AFD.sys, add no driver and no service, and change only kernel memory, which no offline collection of files captures. The LOLDrivers snapshot holds an entry named afd.sys; a hash match on a host's AFD.sys would say only that the build is listed, not that it was exploited. A clean result from the checker therefore says nothing about FudModule on a host that was unpatched in 2023 or 2024; that question needs memory and EDR telemetry. The boot-chain modules (esp, measuredboot, bootsector) are not relevant.

Removal and recovery

  1. Reboot only after memory has been acquired: the rootkit's changes disappear, and so does the evidence.
  2. Remove any vulnerable driver service and file brought by the attacker, and enable memory integrity (HVCI), which enforces Microsoft's vulnerable driver blocklist.
  3. Install the February 2024 and August 2024 Windows updates, and current browser updates, on every host.
  4. Treat the host as fully compromised. FudModule ran with kernel-level control alongside a backdoor; rebuild it and rotate the credentials used on it.
  5. Hunt across the estate for the loader and backdoor that ran it, since those, not the rootkit, are what persist.

Sources

Primary public reports, newest first.

  1. 2024-09-19Evolution of Lazarus 'FudModule - no longer (stand)alone'Gen Digital
  2. 2024-08-30North Korean threat actor Citrine Sleet exploiting Chromium zero-dayMicrosoft
  3. 2024-08-13CVE-2024-38193: Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilityMicrosoft
  4. 2024-02-28Lazarus and the FudModule Rootkit: Beyond BYOVD with an Admin-to-Kernel Zero-DayAvast
  5. 2024-02-13CVE-2024-21338: Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilityMicrosoft
  6. 2022-09-30Amazon-themed campaigns of Lazarus in the Netherlands and BelgiumESET
  7. 2022-09-22Analysis Report on Lazarus Group's Rootkit Attack Using BYOVDAhnLab

See also

Related families