Skip to content

Malicious or abused driver

POORTRY and BURNTCIGAR: Signed EDR-Killer Driver Traces

POORTRY, the signed driver behind the BURNTCIGAR and STONESTOP EDR killers: BYOVD, abused driver signing, service keys, signers, how to check a host offline.

Kind
Malicious or abused driver · Kernel layer
Platforms
Windows
First seen
2021-11
Status
In the wild
Also known as
STONESTOP, KApcHelper, ApcHelper
Checked by
Windows drivers

Overview

POORTRY is a malicious Windows kernel driver whose job is to stop security products: it terminates endpoint protection and EDR processes and, in recent versions, deletes their files. It always works with a user-mode component that tells it what to kill. Vendors name the pieces differently:

NameWhat it isNamed by
BURNTCIGARUser-mode utility that terminates security processes through a driver; first observed in November 2021Mandiant
POORTRYThe malicious driver; device \Device\KApcHelper1Mandiant
STONESTOPUser-mode loader that creates and loads POORTRYMandiant
KApcHelper, ApcHelperFile names of the driver in the incidents Sophos and others describedSophos

Sophos's 2024 report calls the driver "Poortry, sometimes called BurntCigar", which is why this page covers the pair.

The toolset is shared or sold rather than tied to one group. Mandiant first described BURNTCIGAR in intrusions by UNC2596, the cluster it associates with Cuba ransomware, and saw UNC3944 deploy STONESTOP and POORTRY from August 2022; it considers the spread across groups consistent with the malware being sold or freely shared. Sophos linked the 2022 incident it investigated to Cuba ransomware, while noting that it could not know for certain which ransomware the attackers intended to deploy. By 2024 Sophos had seen POORTRY in attacks involving at least five ransomware families: Cuba, BlackCat, Medusa, LockBit and RansomHub.

How it loads and hides

POORTRY illustrates two ways attackers get kernel code past Windows driver signing. Both start with administrative rights on the host; neither is an initial access technique.

Bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD). The earliest BURNTCIGAR samples did not ship their own driver. Mandiant found them installing a legitimate, signed but vulnerable Avast anti-rootkit driver as a kernel service and abusing one of its control codes to terminate processes. The driver was genuine; the abuse was in how it was used. Microsoft's vulnerable driver blocklist and EDR products now target exactly this pattern.

Getting a malicious driver signed. From 2022 the toolset carried its own driver, POORTRY, signed in turn by:

  • certificates issued to little-known companies, several of them based in China;
  • a leaked NVIDIA certificate, revoked after its theft;
  • Microsoft itself, through the attestation signing service of the Windows Hardware Developer Program, after the actors submitted the driver from developer accounts holding EV code-signing certificates. Microsoft's advisory ADV220005 confirmed that several Partner Center accounts had been abused, suspended them and revoked the certificates for the affected files.

After that route closed, Sophos saw the authors return to stolen certificates and to forged signature timestamps that make Windows accept certificates which had already expired. It counted at least nine signing certificates in 17 months, sometimes different ones on machines of the same network, and a 2024 variant whose version information was copied from an Internet Download Manager driver.

Once loaded, the driver does not hide itself. Its purpose is to blind the defences: the user-mode component sends it a list of process names or paths, and it terminates them. The 2024 variant also removes kernel notification callbacks and minifilter registrations and deletes executables and DLLs from hard-coded EDR installation folders.

Traces on disk

LocationWhatSource
C:\Windows\Temp\_aswArPot.sys, service aswSP_ArPot2Vulnerable Avast driver installed by a BURNTCIGAR deployment script, av.batMandiant 2022-02
%TEMP%\<5 to 7 random letters>.sys, a matching driver service (e.g. mEfEk.sys in the case reported)POORTRY copied and registered by the loaderSophos 2022
usnnr.sys in a user's temp folder, loader c7iy3d.exe on a user's desktop2024 incident; driver and loader sit in the same folderSophos 2024
KApcHelper.sys, KApcHelper_x64.sys, NodeDriver.sys, PcieCubed.sys, Sense5Ext.sys, prokiller64.sys, 4.sys, 2.sys and othersPOORTRY sample file namesMandiant 2022-12
Driver signer Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher with the attestation EKU 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.5.1Attestation-signed driver; legitimate drivers carry it tooMandiant 2022-12
Signers NVIDIA Corporation (leaked certificate), Zhuhai Liancheng Technology Co., Ltd., Beijing JoinHope Image Technology Ltd.Signers seen on the 2022 driversSophos 2022
System log 7045Installation of the kernel driver serviceGeneral Windows behaviour

Mandiant lists the organisation names it saw in the program-name field of attestation-signed POORTRY samples; they make useful pivots, with its warning that not every file carrying them is malicious. Hashes are in the cited reports.

How to check a host

Offline:

  • In the SYSTEM hive, list services with Type 1 (kernel driver). Flag any whose ImagePath points to Temp, Users, a desktop or ProgramData, and short random-looking names. The key's last-write time dates the installation.
  • Collect the .sys files these services name and read their signatures. For a Microsoft signature, look at the EKU (attestation, not WHQL) and the program name; for a third-party signer, check whether the certificate is known to be leaked or whether its validity ends before the file was built.
  • In the System log, read 7045 events for new kernel services, and 7036 or 7034 for security services that stopped. In Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational, look for blocked driver loads. Sophos saw attackers switch to a driver with a different signer seconds after its product blocked the first one.
  • Check that EDR and antivirus folders still hold their binaries; the 2024 variant deletes them.

Live, from an elevated prompt, before trusting what security tools report:

Get-CimInstance Win32_SystemDriver | Where-Object PathName -match '\\Temp\\|\\Users\\' | Select-Object Name, State, PathName
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName = 'System'; Id = 7045 } | Format-List TimeCreated, Message
Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational' -MaxEvents 200
Get-AuthenticodeSignature C:\Windows\Temp\*.sys | Format-List Path, Status, SignerCertificate
sigcheck64.exe -accepteula -i -e -s C:\Windows\Temp

The BYOVD hunting guide covers the blocklist, LOLDrivers and Amcache in more depth, and the kernel drivers artifact page lists the related logs.

What the checker looks for

The windrivers module sees the parts of this toolset that touch the disk:

  • a kernel driver service whose ImagePath points into a temporary or user folder raises "A driver service loads its image from" that folder, with the key's write time on the timeline;
  • the .sys file, when it is collected. Its hashes are compared with the LOLDrivers snapshot, which lists POORTRY and BURNTCIGAR samples as malicious and Avast's aswArPot.sys as vulnerable: a match raises "A known malicious driver (LOLDrivers)" or "A known vulnerable driver (LOLDrivers)" with the entry's name. Its Authenticode signer is shown, so that an attestation signature, a leaked certificate or an unexpected company can be weighed; the checker names the signer and does not check revocation. A driver in a temporary folder that no service names raises "A driver file in a writable folder";
  • with the logs: "A kernel driver service was installed" for a 7045 event, and the Code Integrity events it reads, such as "Code Integrity refused a file whose signature could not be verified" (3004) and the App Control block events (3076, 3077).

It cannot see the user-mode loader, the list of targeted processes, or whether EDR files were deleted; those need the file system timeline and the security product's own logs. A driver that was loaded, used and then deregistered leaves only events and file remnants. The boot modules (esp, measuredboot, bootsector) are not relevant: POORTRY does not persist in the boot chain.

Removal and recovery

  1. Treat a POORTRY finding as a sign of hands-on-keyboard activity that usually precedes ransomware. Contain the host and look for the same driver and loader on others: Sophos found different signers on different machines of one network.
  2. Preserve the service key, driver, loader and logs, then delete the service entry and the files and reboot.
  3. Repair or reinstall the security products whose processes or files were removed, and confirm that their tamper protection is on.
  4. Turn on memory integrity (HVCI), which enforces Microsoft's vulnerable driver blocklist, and keep Windows updated; Microsoft's revocations and Defender detections cover the drivers it was told about, not new signers.
  5. Investigate the intrusion that gave the actor administrative rights, rotate the credentials it exposed, and rebuild hosts where kernel code ran if you cannot account for everything it did.

Sources

Primary public reports, newest first.

  1. 2024-08-27Attack tool update impairs Windows computersSophos
  2. 2023-07-11Microsoft Revokes Malicious Drivers in Patch Tuesday CullingSophos
  3. 2022-12-13ADV220005: Guidance on Microsoft Signed Drivers Being Used MaliciouslyMicrosoft
  4. 2022-12-13I Solemnly Swear My Driver Is Up to No Good: Hunting for Attestation Signed MalwareMandiant
  5. 2022-12-13Signed driver malware moves up the software trust chainSophos
  6. 2022-12-13Driving Through Defenses: Targeted Attacks Leverage Signed Malicious Microsoft DriversSentinelOne
  7. 2022-02-23(Ex)Change of Pace: UNC2596 Observed Leveraging Vulnerabilities to Deploy Cuba RansomwareMandiant

See also

Related families