Hiding
DKOM: Direct Kernel Object Manipulation on Windows
How rootkits hide and blind defences by editing Windows kernel data in memory (DKOM): unlinked processes, data-only FudModule, traces and memory checks.
- Goal
- Hiding
- Layer
- Kernel
- Platforms
- Windows
- Also known as
- DKOM, Data-only rootkit
- Used by
- FudModule
- Checked by
- None: no module reads its traces
Overview
Direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) hides things by editing the data structures the kernel keeps in memory, instead of changing kernel code. Windows answers "which processes are running?" or "which drivers are loaded?" by walking lists in kernel memory; remove an entry from the list and the object disappears from every tool that asks, while it keeps working.
The idea was presented at Black Hat Windows Security in January 2004 (slides). The deck lists the uses: hide processes, add privileges and groups to tokens, make a process's actions appear as SYSTEM in the event log, hide ports. It presents DKOM as the step after hooking, which "is easy to detect": no code changes, so a check of kernel code finds nothing.
The modern form is the data-only rootkit. It needs only a way to write kernel memory, from a vulnerable driver (BYOVD) or a kernel vulnerability, and may never load a driver of its own. Its target has shifted from hiding the attacker's objects to switching off the kernel's reporting to security products. Linux rootkits apply the same idea to the kernel's module and task lists; see hiding loadable kernel modules.
How it works
| Target | Structure (as public tools name it) | Effect | Independent view a responder can compare |
|---|---|---|---|
| Process list | Each EPROCESS's ActiveProcessLinks entry, in the list headed by PsActiveProcessHead | The process disappears from enumeration; its threads still run, because scheduling is per thread | Pool scanning for process and thread objects; handles held by csrss.exe |
| Loaded module list | Entries of PsLoadedModuleList | A driver disappears from module listings | Scans for driver and module objects |
| Access tokens | Privileges and group SIDs inside a token | A process gains rights; logs attribute it to SYSTEM | Token contents in a memory image |
| Notification arrays and lists | The arrays and lists that hold process, thread, image, registry and object callbacks | Security drivers stop being told about activity | Callback listings; see removing kernel notification callbacks |
| ETW provider registrations | Registration and enable-information structures of ETW providers | Providers stop emitting events | Health tests of the telemetry stream |
| Process protection | A process's protection level and handle table entries | Security processes lose protection or can be suspended | Process attributes in memory |
The structure names in the first rows are those Volatility uses to walk the lists; the ETW structures are named in IBM X-Force's analysis.
Kernel Patch Protection. On 64-bit Windows, Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard) checks key kernel structures and code and stops the system when it finds unauthorised changes (Microsoft). Microsoft's list of what triggers bug check 0x109 includes four kinds of process list corruption, loaded module list modification, kernel notification callout modification and modification of a protected process. Classic unlinking therefore risks a crash on current systems, and data-only rootkits pick structures and timing accordingly. Microsoft also says KPP does not stop all rootkits: it closes one route.
Memory integrity (HVCI) protects kernel code pages, not most data. Microsoft added Kernel Data Protection (KDP) under virtualization-based security so that selected data, such as Code Integrity's policy state, becomes read-only once initialised (Microsoft); structures that are not protected this way remain writable to anyone with a kernel write primitive.
How families use it
FudModule. Avast describes it as "a data-only rootkit" that "employs direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) techniques", and Gen Digital says the 2024 AFD.sys exploit was used to enable "Direct Kernel Object Manipulation". It runs in a user-mode process and, once it can write kernel memory, edits:
- the registry, process, thread and image-load callback lists, keeping only an allowlist of modules, and all object callbacks;
- the callback lists of file system minifilters in the antivirus and activity-monitor altitude ranges;
- ETW: system loggers and providers from a list of 95 GUIDs (Avast); IBM X-Force found that the 2021 version nulled the registration handles of providers registered by the kernel;
- Windows Filtering Platform callouts, conditionally;
- named security processes: one loses its protected status, others are suspended through handle table entry manipulation.
ESET's summary of the 2021 version is the same in brief: "modifying kernel variables and removing kernel callbacks". The kernel access came from a Dell driver (2021), an ENE driver (2022), then zero-days in appid.sys and AFD.sys (2023, 2024). No rootkit driver is loaded at any stage, and the changes last until reboot.
A contrast: Demodex. Kaspersky reports that Demodex's kernel driver looks up the malware's service "in a system-maintained linked list" within the services.exe process and unlinks it, so that tools asking the Service Control Manager no longer see it. That changes a user-mode list from the kernel, which is not DKOM: the list belongs to a process, not to the kernel. It is found the same way, by comparing a walked list with a scan (see below).
Traces it leaves
| Trace | Where | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Objects present in a scan but absent from lists | Memory image | The direct evidence: a process found by pool or thread scanning but not in ActiveProcessLinks; a driver object whose module is not listed |
| Missing callback, minifilter or ETW entries | Memory image | Compare with a clean host of the same build running the same security products |
| Telemetry gaps | EDR, Sysmon, Prefetch, crash dumps | Security tools still running but silent; Prefetch or crash dumps no longer written (FudModule) |
tem1245.tmp | Folder not published | FudModule's status file (Avast) |
| Bug check 0x109 | Crash dumps, System log | A KPP-detected change, or a hardware or driver fault |
| The route into the kernel | Driver services and files, or a missing patch | See BYOVD; for FudModule's zero-days, the February and August 2024 updates |
The manipulation itself is never on disk.
How to check a host
Capture memory first. DKOM exists only in RAM, and a reboot erases it. Acquire memory with a tool such as WinPmem or your EDR's collection feature before any cleanup, then analyse it elsewhere with Volatility 3:
vol -f host.raw windows.malware.psxview
vol -f host.raw windows.psscan
vol -f host.raw windows.malware.drivermodule
vol -f host.raw windows.modscan
vol -f host.raw windows.malware.svcdiff
vol -f host.raw windows.callbacks
windows.malware.psxview lists processes found by walking the process list, by pool scanning, by thread scanning and through csrss.exe handles: a process missing only from the list was unlinked. windows.malware.drivermodule reports drivers whose module was hidden. windows.callbacks lists process, thread, image and registry callbacks to compare against a reference host. windows.malware.svcdiff, which compares the services found by walking the SCM's list with those found by scanning, covers the related Demodex case.
Live, tools that ask Windows see the edited lists, so a clean listing proves nothing. What a live host can still show is behaviour: IBM X-Force's defensive note on FudModule proposes a health test: generate known activity and check that Sysmon or the EDR recorded it. In its lab, the Sysmon service and its trace kept running while no process creation events reached the log. Check that security products still report to their consoles.
Offline, a disk image shows the route in and the side effects: the vulnerable driver's service and file, missing updates, tem1245.tmp, Prefetch that stops. It cannot show the manipulation.
What the checker looks for
Nothing of DKOM itself. The checker reads files and logs; the manipulation lives only in kernel memory, so checks is empty for this technique. What the windrivers module can see is the way in when it touched the disk: the vulnerable driver a data-only rootkit used, matched against LOLDrivers, with its service and its 7045 and CodeIntegrity events, as described under BYOVD. A clean result says nothing about DKOM on a host that was running when the collection was made; use a memory image. What an offline rootkit check can and cannot prove explains where file-based checks stop.
Mitigation and recovery
- Deny the write primitive: the vulnerable driver blocklist with memory integrity (HVCI), current Windows updates for kernel and driver vulnerabilities, and fewer administrators. Data-only attacks need no rootkit driver, but they always need kernel write access.
- Memory integrity and KDP protect code and selected data; they do not make all kernel data read-only. Kernel Patch Protection detects some list changes on 64-bit Windows, after the fact, by crashing the system.
- Watch the telemetry, not only the alerts: a security product that falls silent on one host is a finding.
Recovery: acquire memory before rebooting. A reboot undoes FudModule's changes but not whatever ran while defences were blind, nor the loader that will run it again. Treat the host as fully compromised, rebuild it, rotate the credentials used on it, and hunt the estate for the loader and the route into the kernel.
Sources
Primary public reports, newest first.
- 2025-03-07When the absence of noise becomes signal: defensive considerations for Lazarus FudModuleIBM X-Force
- 2024-09-19Evolution of Lazarus 'FudModule - no longer (stand)alone'Gen Digital
- 2024-02-28Lazarus and the FudModule Rootkit: Beyond BYOVD with an Admin-to-Kernel Zero-DayAvast
- 2023-02-21Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) Attacks on ETW ProvidersIBM X-Force
- 2022-09-30Amazon-themed campaigns of Lazarus in the Netherlands and BelgiumESET
- 2021-09-30GhostEmperor: From ProxyLogon to kernel modeKaspersky
- 2020-07-08Introducing Kernel Data ProtectionMicrosoft
- 2020-05-13Bug Check 0x109: CRITICAL_STRUCTURE_CORRUPTIONMicrosoft
- 2006-08-12An Introduction to Kernel Patch ProtectionMicrosoft
- 2004-01-29DKOM (Direct Kernel Object Manipulation)Black Hat Windows Security 2004
See also
Related techniques
- Hiding a loaded kernel moduleHiding
- Removing kernel notification callbacksBlinding defences
- Bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD)Getting into the kernel
- Kernel hooks on Windows (inline, SSDT, IRP)Hiding
Families that use it
- FudModuleWindows kernel rootkit