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Blinding defences

Kernel Callback Removal: How Rootkits Blind Windows EDR

How kernel rootkits remove or neuter the process, image, registry, object, minifilter and ETW callbacks that EDR relies on, the traces left and how to check.

Goal
Blinding defences
Layer
Kernel
Platforms
Windows
Also known as
Kernel callback tampering, EDR blinding, Notify routine removal
Checked by
None: no module reads its traces

Overview

Security products watch a Windows machine through interfaces the kernel offers to drivers: notification routines called when a process, thread or image is created, callbacks on handle operations and registry calls, file system minifilters, network callouts and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW). Removing a security product's entries from those lists, or making its callback return at once, leaves the product installed and running but blind. That is this technique's goal: evade, not hide.

The dependence is historical. When Kernel Patch Protection stopped vendors from patching the 64-bit kernel, Microsoft pointed them to the documented alternatives, among them the Windows Filtering Platform, file system minifilters and registry notification (Microsoft, 2006); IBM X-Force makes the same point about kernel callbacks. Those registrations live in kernel memory, so an attacker who can write kernel memory, through a vulnerable driver, a validly signed malicious driver or a kernel exploit, can remove them. The technique is a common step before ransomware deployment and in espionage tooling alike.

How it works

MechanismRegistered withWhat a security product learnsAfter removal
Process notificationPsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine(Ex)Process creation and exit, with the option to block (Ex)New processes go unseen
Thread notificationPsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutineThread creation, including remote threadsInjection goes unseen
Image load notificationPsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineDLL and driver loadsLoads go unseen
Object callbacksObRegisterCallbacksHandle operations on processes and threads; used to protect the product's own processesSelf-protection and handle monitoring lost
Registry callbacksCmRegisterCallback(Ex)Registry operationsPersistence written unseen
File system minifiltersFilter Manager; altitudes in load order groups, for example FSFilter Anti-Virus 320000 to 329999 and FSFilter Activity Monitor 360000 to 389999 (Microsoft)File I/OFiles written and read unseen
Network calloutsWindows Filtering PlatformConnections and trafficNetwork activity unseen
ETW providersKernel providers, including Microsoft-Windows-Threat-IntelligenceEvent streams consumed by EDR and SysmonTelemetry stops

There are two ways to neutralise an entry:

  • Remove it from the data: zero the slot in a notification array, unlink the list node, null an ETW registration handle. Only kernel data changes, so code integrity checks see nothing; this is direct kernel object manipulation.
  • Patch the callback's code so that it returns immediately. This changes code, which memory integrity (HVCI) is designed to prevent; Avast reports that FudModule rewrote its minifilter technique as a data-only attack because patching conflicted with HVCI.

Tools choose their targets by owner: they resolve which driver each callback belongs to and compare it with a list of security drivers, keeping Windows' own entries so the system stays stable.

The ETW Threat-Intelligence provider deserves a note. IBM X-Force describes it as a core data source for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, whose registration is restricted to early-launch antimalware drivers and whose consumers must be protected processes. Sophos reports that BlackByte ransomware included routines to deactivate it. For the catalogue families, the sources do not name it as a confirmed target (see below).

How families use it

FudModule. ESET summarised the 2021 version as disabling "seven mechanisms" by "modifying kernel variables and removing kernel callbacks"; AhnLab's 2022 list names the minifilter, process, thread and module detection, registry callbacks, object callbacks, WFP network filtering, event tracing and Prefetch creation. Avast's 2024 analysis gives the detail:

  • registry callbacks removed except those of ntoskrnl.exe, applockerfltr.sys and bfs.sys;
  • all object callbacks removed;
  • process, thread and image callback arrays replaced, keeping an allowlist of modules, after temporarily clearing the mask that enables them;
  • minifilter callbacks unlinked when the filter's default altitude falls in the antivirus or activity-monitor ranges, with hmpalert.sys unlinked by name;
  • WFP callouts tampered with, only when Kaspersky drivers are present and Symantec/Broadcom ones are not;
  • ETW system loggers stopped and providers from a list of 95 GUIDs disabled;
  • image verification callbacks cleared (removed again in version 3, per Gen Digital).

Avast mentions Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence only as background and does not list the 95 GUIDs. IBM X-Force found that the 2021 version nulled the registration handles of the providers the kernel registers, with no filtering by GUID. All of this is done from user mode through a kernel write primitive; no FudModule driver is loaded.

POORTRY. Sophos's 2024 analysis describes the driver iterating the internal structures behind PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine, PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine and PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, the list used by CmRegisterCallback, the object callback lists, and the minifilters enumerated with FltEnumerateFilters. For callbacks that belong to a "tagged" security driver, it patches the first instruction of the callback to return immediately. The same variant then deletes EDR files from disk, which Sophos calls the move from "EDR killer" to "EDR wiper".

Outside the catalogue, Sophos's BlackByte analysis shows the data route: through the vulnerable RTCore64.sys, the ransomware overwrote the process, thread and image notification array entries of more than 1,000 listed security drivers with zeros, and deactivated the Threat-Intelligence ETW provider with code Sophos traced to the open-source EDRSandblast.

Traces it leaves

TraceWhereNotes
Missing or patched callbacksMemory imageEntries of an installed security product absent from the arrays and lists, or its callback code starting with an immediate return
Silent security toolsEDR console, Sysmon, Defender logsAgents still running but reporting nothing new for the period
Gaps in local artefactsPrefetch, crash dumps, event logsFudModule disabled Prefetch creation (AhnLab) and crash dumps (Gen Digital)
Deleted EDR filesSecurity product folders, MFT, USN journalPOORTRY 2024
The tool that wrote kernel memoryDriver services, .sys files, Amcache, 7045 and CodeIntegrity eventsA vulnerable or malicious driver; for FudModule's later versions, a missing patch instead
tem1245.tmpFile systemFudModule's status file (Avast)

Removal happens in memory and lasts until reboot. Nothing on disk records it directly.

How to check a host

Memory is the only direct evidence. Capture it before rebooting, then compare with a clean host of the same Windows build running the same security products:

vol -f host.raw windows.callbacks
vol -f host.raw windows.modules
vol -f host.raw windows.unloadedmodules

windows.callbacks lists the process, thread and image notification routines, registry callbacks and other kernel callbacks with the module that owns each. A security driver that is loaded (windows.modules) but owns no callbacks is a finding. Dump the security driver's code to see whether a callback's first instruction was replaced. Object callbacks, minifilter instances and ETW registrations need a debugger or specialised tooling.

Live, look at behaviour, since listings come from the kernel the attacker changed:

  • generate known activity and confirm the EDR and Sysmon record it, as IBM X-Force proposes for ETW;
  • check that each agent still reports to its console and that its files are intact;
  • fltmc filters and fltmc instances show which minifilters Filter Manager knows; a filter can stay registered after its callbacks have been unlinked, so a normal listing proves little;
  • logman query -ets lists running trace sessions, to compare with what the security products should have started.

Offline, look for the tool: the driver service and file, its 7045 and CodeIntegrity events, its Amcache entry, and the gaps above.

What the checker looks for

The removal itself is out of reach: it exists only in kernel memory, so checks is empty for this technique. The windrivers module can see the tool when it touched the disk:

  • a POORTRY driver whose hash is in its LOLDrivers snapshot raises "A known malicious driver (LOLDrivers)", and a vulnerable driver such as rtcore64.sys or FudModule's dbutil_2_3.sys the vulnerable-driver finding;
  • a driver service image in Temp, AppData or another writable folder raises the path finding, and its installation the 7045 finding;
  • CodeIntegrity refusals of that driver, and memory integrity turned off in the hive.

A clean result does not mean the callbacks are intact. FudModule's 2023 and 2024 versions brought no driver at all.

Mitigation and recovery

  • Memory integrity (HVCI) blocks the code-patching route and enforces the vulnerable driver blocklist; the data route still needs a kernel write primitive, which the blocklist, driver allowlisting and patching make harder to obtain.
  • Keep the security product's own protections on: tamper protection, protected service status and early-launch antimalware where the vendor supports them.
  • Monitor for silence. Alert when an agent stops reporting, and test telemetry health periodically.

Recovery: capture memory first. A reboot restores callbacks that were removed in memory, but not what happened while defences were blind, and POORTRY's file deletion survives the reboot. Reinstall or repair the security products, rebuild hosts where kernel code ran if you cannot account for it, rotate credentials, and look across the estate for the same driver and loader: these tools usually precede ransomware.

Sources

Primary public reports, newest first.

  1. 2025-03-07When the absence of noise becomes signal: defensive considerations for Lazarus FudModuleIBM X-Force
  2. 2024-09-19Evolution of Lazarus 'FudModule - no longer (stand)alone'Gen Digital
  3. 2024-08-27Attack tool update impairs Windows computersSophos
  4. 2024-02-28Lazarus and the FudModule Rootkit: Beyond BYOVD with an Admin-to-Kernel Zero-DayAvast
  5. 2023-02-21Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) Attacks on ETW ProvidersIBM X-Force
  6. 2022-10-04BlackByte ransomware returnsSophos
  7. 2022-09-30Amazon-themed campaigns of Lazarus in the Netherlands and BelgiumESET
  8. 2022-09-22Analysis Report on Lazarus Group's Rootkit Attack Using BYOVDAhnLab
  9. 2006-08-12An Introduction to Kernel Patch ProtectionMicrosoft

See also

Families that use it