Blinding defences
Kernel Callback Removal: How Rootkits Blind Windows EDR
How kernel rootkits remove or neuter the process, image, registry, object, minifilter and ETW callbacks that EDR relies on, the traces left and how to check.
- Goal
- Blinding defences
- Layer
- Kernel
- Platforms
- Windows
- Also known as
- Kernel callback tampering, EDR blinding, Notify routine removal
- Checked by
- None: no module reads its traces
Overview
Security products watch a Windows machine through interfaces the kernel offers to drivers: notification routines called when a process, thread or image is created, callbacks on handle operations and registry calls, file system minifilters, network callouts and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW). Removing a security product's entries from those lists, or making its callback return at once, leaves the product installed and running but blind. That is this technique's goal: evade, not hide.
The dependence is historical. When Kernel Patch Protection stopped vendors from patching the 64-bit kernel, Microsoft pointed them to the documented alternatives, among them the Windows Filtering Platform, file system minifilters and registry notification (Microsoft, 2006); IBM X-Force makes the same point about kernel callbacks. Those registrations live in kernel memory, so an attacker who can write kernel memory, through a vulnerable driver, a validly signed malicious driver or a kernel exploit, can remove them. The technique is a common step before ransomware deployment and in espionage tooling alike.
How it works
| Mechanism | Registered with | What a security product learns | After removal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Process notification | PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine(Ex) | Process creation and exit, with the option to block (Ex) | New processes go unseen |
| Thread notification | PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine | Thread creation, including remote threads | Injection goes unseen |
| Image load notification | PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine | DLL and driver loads | Loads go unseen |
| Object callbacks | ObRegisterCallbacks | Handle operations on processes and threads; used to protect the product's own processes | Self-protection and handle monitoring lost |
| Registry callbacks | CmRegisterCallback(Ex) | Registry operations | Persistence written unseen |
| File system minifilters | Filter Manager; altitudes in load order groups, for example FSFilter Anti-Virus 320000 to 329999 and FSFilter Activity Monitor 360000 to 389999 (Microsoft) | File I/O | Files written and read unseen |
| Network callouts | Windows Filtering Platform | Connections and traffic | Network activity unseen |
| ETW providers | Kernel providers, including Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence | Event streams consumed by EDR and Sysmon | Telemetry stops |
There are two ways to neutralise an entry:
- Remove it from the data: zero the slot in a notification array, unlink the list node, null an ETW registration handle. Only kernel data changes, so code integrity checks see nothing; this is direct kernel object manipulation.
- Patch the callback's code so that it returns immediately. This changes code, which memory integrity (HVCI) is designed to prevent; Avast reports that FudModule rewrote its minifilter technique as a data-only attack because patching conflicted with HVCI.
Tools choose their targets by owner: they resolve which driver each callback belongs to and compare it with a list of security drivers, keeping Windows' own entries so the system stays stable.
The ETW Threat-Intelligence provider deserves a note. IBM X-Force describes it as a core data source for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, whose registration is restricted to early-launch antimalware drivers and whose consumers must be protected processes. Sophos reports that BlackByte ransomware included routines to deactivate it. For the catalogue families, the sources do not name it as a confirmed target (see below).
How families use it
FudModule. ESET summarised the 2021 version as disabling "seven mechanisms" by "modifying kernel variables and removing kernel callbacks"; AhnLab's 2022 list names the minifilter, process, thread and module detection, registry callbacks, object callbacks, WFP network filtering, event tracing and Prefetch creation. Avast's 2024 analysis gives the detail:
- registry callbacks removed except those of
ntoskrnl.exe,applockerfltr.sysandbfs.sys; - all object callbacks removed;
- process, thread and image callback arrays replaced, keeping an allowlist of modules, after temporarily clearing the mask that enables them;
- minifilter callbacks unlinked when the filter's default altitude falls in the antivirus or activity-monitor ranges, with
hmpalert.sysunlinked by name; - WFP callouts tampered with, only when Kaspersky drivers are present and Symantec/Broadcom ones are not;
- ETW system loggers stopped and providers from a list of 95 GUIDs disabled;
- image verification callbacks cleared (removed again in version 3, per Gen Digital).
Avast mentions Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence only as background and does not list the 95 GUIDs. IBM X-Force found that the 2021 version nulled the registration handles of the providers the kernel registers, with no filtering by GUID. All of this is done from user mode through a kernel write primitive; no FudModule driver is loaded.
POORTRY. Sophos's 2024 analysis describes the driver iterating the internal structures behind PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine, PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine and PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, the list used by CmRegisterCallback, the object callback lists, and the minifilters enumerated with FltEnumerateFilters. For callbacks that belong to a "tagged" security driver, it patches the first instruction of the callback to return immediately. The same variant then deletes EDR files from disk, which Sophos calls the move from "EDR killer" to "EDR wiper".
Outside the catalogue, Sophos's BlackByte analysis shows the data route: through the vulnerable RTCore64.sys, the ransomware overwrote the process, thread and image notification array entries of more than 1,000 listed security drivers with zeros, and deactivated the Threat-Intelligence ETW provider with code Sophos traced to the open-source EDRSandblast.
Traces it leaves
| Trace | Where | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Missing or patched callbacks | Memory image | Entries of an installed security product absent from the arrays and lists, or its callback code starting with an immediate return |
| Silent security tools | EDR console, Sysmon, Defender logs | Agents still running but reporting nothing new for the period |
| Gaps in local artefacts | Prefetch, crash dumps, event logs | FudModule disabled Prefetch creation (AhnLab) and crash dumps (Gen Digital) |
| Deleted EDR files | Security product folders, MFT, USN journal | POORTRY 2024 |
| The tool that wrote kernel memory | Driver services, .sys files, Amcache, 7045 and CodeIntegrity events | A vulnerable or malicious driver; for FudModule's later versions, a missing patch instead |
tem1245.tmp | File system | FudModule's status file (Avast) |
Removal happens in memory and lasts until reboot. Nothing on disk records it directly.
How to check a host
Memory is the only direct evidence. Capture it before rebooting, then compare with a clean host of the same Windows build running the same security products:
vol -f host.raw windows.callbacks
vol -f host.raw windows.modules
vol -f host.raw windows.unloadedmodules
windows.callbacks lists the process, thread and image notification routines, registry callbacks and other kernel callbacks with the module that owns each. A security driver that is loaded (windows.modules) but owns no callbacks is a finding. Dump the security driver's code to see whether a callback's first instruction was replaced. Object callbacks, minifilter instances and ETW registrations need a debugger or specialised tooling.
Live, look at behaviour, since listings come from the kernel the attacker changed:
- generate known activity and confirm the EDR and Sysmon record it, as IBM X-Force proposes for ETW;
- check that each agent still reports to its console and that its files are intact;
fltmc filtersandfltmc instancesshow which minifilters Filter Manager knows; a filter can stay registered after its callbacks have been unlinked, so a normal listing proves little;logman query -etslists running trace sessions, to compare with what the security products should have started.
Offline, look for the tool: the driver service and file, its 7045 and CodeIntegrity events, its Amcache entry, and the gaps above.
What the checker looks for
The removal itself is out of reach: it exists only in kernel memory, so checks is empty for this technique. The windrivers module can see the tool when it touched the disk:
- a POORTRY driver whose hash is in its LOLDrivers snapshot raises "A known malicious driver (LOLDrivers)", and a vulnerable driver such as
rtcore64.sysor FudModule'sdbutil_2_3.systhe vulnerable-driver finding; - a driver service image in
Temp,AppDataor another writable folder raises the path finding, and its installation the 7045 finding; - CodeIntegrity refusals of that driver, and memory integrity turned off in the hive.
A clean result does not mean the callbacks are intact. FudModule's 2023 and 2024 versions brought no driver at all.
Mitigation and recovery
- Memory integrity (HVCI) blocks the code-patching route and enforces the vulnerable driver blocklist; the data route still needs a kernel write primitive, which the blocklist, driver allowlisting and patching make harder to obtain.
- Keep the security product's own protections on: tamper protection, protected service status and early-launch antimalware where the vendor supports them.
- Monitor for silence. Alert when an agent stops reporting, and test telemetry health periodically.
Recovery: capture memory first. A reboot restores callbacks that were removed in memory, but not what happened while defences were blind, and POORTRY's file deletion survives the reboot. Reinstall or repair the security products, rebuild hosts where kernel code ran if you cannot account for it, rotate credentials, and look across the estate for the same driver and loader: these tools usually precede ransomware.
Sources
Primary public reports, newest first.
- 2025-03-07When the absence of noise becomes signal: defensive considerations for Lazarus FudModuleIBM X-Force
- 2024-09-19Evolution of Lazarus 'FudModule - no longer (stand)alone'Gen Digital
- 2024-08-27Attack tool update impairs Windows computersSophos
- 2024-02-28Lazarus and the FudModule Rootkit: Beyond BYOVD with an Admin-to-Kernel Zero-DayAvast
- 2023-02-21Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) Attacks on ETW ProvidersIBM X-Force
- 2022-10-04BlackByte ransomware returnsSophos
- 2022-09-30Amazon-themed campaigns of Lazarus in the Netherlands and BelgiumESET
- 2022-09-22Analysis Report on Lazarus Group's Rootkit Attack Using BYOVDAhnLab
- 2006-08-12An Introduction to Kernel Patch ProtectionMicrosoft
See also
Related techniques
- Direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM)Hiding
- Bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD)Getting into the kernel
- File system and network filter driversHiding
- Malicious drivers with valid signaturesGetting into the kernel
Families that use it
- FudModuleWindows kernel rootkit
- POORTRY / BURNTCIGARMalicious or abused driver