20 ยท Techniques
Rootkit techniques
Each page explains one technique the catalogue's rootkit families use, at the level a responder needs: what it changes and where, the traces it leaves, how to check a host offline and live, what the checker sees, and how to recover. Techniques are grouped by what they achieve for the rootkit; the matrix shows which family uses which. Boot-level techniques are covered on bootkits.dev.
Getting into the kernel5
How rootkit code reaches the kernel: a driver or kernel module loaded under a signature that should not be trusted, a signed but vulnerable driver abused to write kernel memory, or the check on what loads switched off. Loading is the step most likely to leave traces on disk: a driver or module file, a service or load entry, and log lines.
- Bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD)How attackers load signed but vulnerable Windows drivers to reach the kernel, the service, file and Code Integrity traces, and the blocklist and HVCI defences.WindowsKernel4 families
- Driver signature enforcement tamperingHow attackers switch off Windows driver signature enforcement: test signing, nointegritychecks, Code Integrity flags. BCD, event 4826 traces, Secure Boot, HVCI.WindowsKernel1 family
- Loading a kernel module from memoryHow Linux rootkit loaders hand the kernel a decrypted module from memory so no .ko file reaches disk, what the kernel still records, and how to check a host.LinuxKernel2 families
- Malicious drivers with valid signaturesHow attackers get malicious Windows drivers signed: Microsoft's hardware program, stolen certificates, forged timestamps. Signer traces, checks and revocation.WindowsKernel2 families
- Replacing a Windows system driverHow rootkits overwrite a Windows driver that already loads at boot, keep its service key, serve the clean copy to scanners, and how to check a host offline.WindowsKernel1 family
Hiding12
How a rootkit keeps its files, processes, modules and connections out of what the system reports: by hooking the functions that answer, filtering their results, or unlinking its objects from the lists the kernel walks. A host that hides things this way lies to the tools run on it, which is why an offline look at its disk or memory matters.
- Direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM)How rootkits hide and blind defences by editing Windows kernel data in memory (DKOM): unlinked processes, data-only FudModule, traces and memory checks.WindowsKernel1 family
- Dynamic linker preloading (LD_PRELOAD)How userland rootkits use LD_PRELOAD and /etc/ld.so.preload to replace libc functions in every program, what they leave on disk, and how to check a host.LinuxUserland4 families
- eBPF programs as rootkitsHow eBPF programs hide files, processes and traffic without a kernel module, how classic BPF differs, and how to find them live, in memory and on disk.LinuxKernel1 family
- Encrypted hidden storageHow Windows kernel rootkits keep tools and data in encrypted containers only their driver can open: Snake's covert store, ZeroAccess's volumes. Traces, checks.WindowsKernel2 families
- File system and network filter driversHow Windows rootkits use file system filters, registry filters and WFP callout drivers to hide files and steer traffic, and how responders list and check them.WindowsKernel2 families
- ftrace and kprobe hookingHow Linux rootkits use ftrace and kprobes, the kernel's own tracing hooks, to divert functions, and how enabled_functions and memory analysis reveal them.LinuxKernel2 families
- Hiding a loaded kernel moduleHow Linux rootkits drop out of lsmod, /proc/modules and /sys/module while still loaded, what the kernel's taint flags and logs keep, and how to check a host.LinuxKernel7 families
- Inline kernel function hookingHow Linux rootkits overwrite the first instructions of kernel functions to divert them, as Reptile's KHOOK and Syslogk do, and how to find the patched code.LinuxKernel3 families
- Kernel hooks on Windows (inline, SSDT, IRP)How Windows kernel rootkits hook functions, service tables and driver dispatch routines to hide, why PatchGuard and HVCI changed that, and how to check memory.WindowsKernel3 families
- System call table hookingHow Linux rootkits replace sys_call_table entries to hide files and processes, why newer kernels resist it, and how to check a host from memory and disk.LinuxKernel2 families
- Userland API hookingHow user-mode Windows rootkits such as r77 inject into every process and hook ntdll APIs to hide files, keys and processes, the traces left and how to check.WindowsUserland1 family
- VFS and /proc hookingHow Linux kernel rootkits hide files, processes and connections inside the VFS and /proc, what that leaves in memory and on disk, and how to check a host.LinuxKernel5 families
Blinding defences1
How a rootkit stops security tools from seeing it: removing the kernel callbacks they register, or tampering with what they rely on from the kernel. The host keeps running and reporting, but the defences no longer see what happens on it.
Backdoors and covert channels2
How a rootkit keeps a way back in that ordinary monitoring misses: a backdoor that wakes on a crafted packet instead of listening on a port, or an authentication module that lets a hard-coded password in.
- Magic-packet backdoorsHow kernel rootkits on Linux and Windows wait for a crafted packet instead of opening a port, the hooks they use to see it, and how to detect them on a host.LinuxWindowsKernel6 families
- PAM backdoorsHow Linux rootkits backdoor PAM with a replaced pam_unix.so or with preloaded hooks on libpam, what each leaves behind, and how to verify PAM on a host.LinuxUserland3 families
Which family uses which technique
Techniques by goal down the side, the catalogue's families across the top, grouped by platform. A mark means the family's page documents its use of the technique.
ATT&CK coverage
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques each technique page maps to.