Getting into the kernel
BYOVD: Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver on Windows
How attackers load signed but vulnerable Windows drivers to reach the kernel, the service, file and Code Integrity traces, and the blocklist and HVCI defences.
- Goal
- Getting into the kernel
- Layer
- Kernel
- Platforms
- Windows
- Also known as
- BYOVD, Bring your own driver
- Checked by
- Windows drivers
Overview
Bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD) is a way into the Windows kernel that needs no signature of the attacker's own. An attacker who is already an administrator installs a legitimate, validly signed driver with a known flaw, then uses the flaw from user mode to read and write kernel memory, run kernel code or stop protected processes. Windows loads the driver because its signature is good. MITRE ATT&CK files it under Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068): adversaries "may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine".
The technique exists because of driver signing. 64-bit Windows refuses unsigned kernel code, and since Windows 10 version 1607 it does not load new kernel drivers that Microsoft's portal has not signed, apart from documented exceptions (driver signing policy). Microsoft's driver block rules page states the consequence: malicious actors "are turning to exploit vulnerabilities in legitimate and signed kernel drivers". Avast's FudModule report recalls that Microsoft does not treat administrator-to-kernel as a security boundary, so BYOVD is a post-compromise step, not a way in.
It is not new. G DATA described Snake bringing an old VirtualBox driver in 2014, and by 2022 ransomware operators used the same pattern against security products (Sophos).
How it works
| Step | What changes | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Bring | A signed third-party driver (hardware utility, overclocking tool, anti-cheat, antivirus) is written to disk, often under a new name | Any folder: System32\drivers, ProgramData, Windows\Temp, a user profile |
| Register | A kernel driver service is created: Type 1, Start 3 (demand) for a one-off load, 0 to 2 to survive reboots | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<name> |
| Load | The service starts; Code Integrity checks the signature and, where enforced, the vulnerable driver blocklist | Kernel; System and CodeIntegrity logs |
| Abuse | A user-mode program opens the driver's device and sends control requests (IOCTLs) the driver should never have exposed | Kernel memory |
| Act | With that access the attacker edits kernel data, turns off signature enforcement, maps an unsigned driver or kills security processes | See the related techniques |
| Clean up | Optionally, the service and file are deleted; in-memory effects last until reboot | Events and inventory remain |
The flaw decides what the attacker gets. Arbitrary kernel read and write supports direct kernel object manipulation, callback removal or switching off signature enforcement; a driver that loads code by design, such as Cheat Engine's, can map an unsigned rootkit; one that terminates processes on request can kill an EDR agent. The vulnerable driver hides nothing itself: it is the means.
How families use it
| Family | Driver brought | Used for | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| FudModule, 2021 | Dell dbutil_2_3.sys, CVE-2021-21551 | Kernel write access to disable monitoring | ESET |
| FudModule, 2022 | ENE Technology ene.sys, built on the old WinIO library | The same | AhnLab |
| Snake, 2014 | Oracle VirtualBox VBoxDrv.sys 1.6.2 | Disabling driver signature enforcement before loading the unsigned rootkit driver | G DATA |
| Demodex | Cheat Engine's signed driver (dbk64.sys) under a random name | Mapping the unsigned rootkit into the kernel without modifying Code Integrity | Kaspersky, Sygnia |
| POORTRY / BURNTCIGAR, 2021 | Avast's anti-rootkit driver, C:\Windows\Temp\aswArPot.sys, service aswSP_ArPot2 | Terminating security processes | Mandiant |
Two of these families moved on. FudModule's 2023 and 2024 versions exploited zero-days in drivers Windows already ships (appid.sys, AFD.sys), which Avast presents as a way to avoid the dropped driver, service and load event that BYOVD leaves. POORTRY switched to a driver of its own with a valid signature, covered under malicious drivers with valid signatures. For the 2021 FudModule intrusions, IBM X-Force reports that the Dell driver was written to System32\drivers under one of six names: circlassmgr.sys, dmvscmgr.sys, hidirmgr.sys, isapnpmgr.sys, mspqmmgr.sys or umpassmgr.sys.
Outside the catalogue, Sophos documented BlackByte ransomware dropping MSI Afterburner's RTCore64.sys (CVE-2019-16098) into AppData\Roaming to remove security callbacks. The same logic reaches below the operating system: ESET reported that LoJax used RwDrv.sys, the signed driver of the RWEverything utility, to read and rewrite the SPI flash; bootkits.dev covers that case under SPI flash writes.
Traces it leaves
| Trace | Location | What to read |
|---|---|---|
| Driver file | Where ImagePath points; by default System32\drivers\<name>.sys | A valid vendor signature; OriginalFilename in the version information when the file was renamed; hashes to compare with LOLDrivers and the blocklist |
| Service key | SYSTEM hive, ControlSet00x\Services\<name> | Type 1, Start, an ImagePath outside System32\drivers and the DriverStore, the key's last-write time |
| Amcache | Amcache.hve, Root\InventoryDriverBinary | The driver's SHA-1, kept after the file is deleted |
| System log | 7045, 7000, 7026 | Service installed; failed start (a refused driver); boot driver not loaded |
| Security log | 4697 | Service installed, when "Audit Security System Extension" is on |
| CodeIntegrity log | 3023, 3077 or 3076, 3033, 3004, 3089, 3099 | Driver refused by policy, the blocklist included; signature details; which policies loaded |
| Protection settings | Control\CI\Config\VulnerableDriverBlocklistEnable; Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\Enabled | 0 means the blocklist or memory integrity was turned off |
| Sysmon, if deployed | Event 6 | Driver loaded, with hashes and signature |
| Memory | Loaded and recently unloaded module lists | A driver that ran and was removed |
The event descriptions come from Microsoft's App Control event IDs; hunting vulnerable and malicious drivers offline explains each source and its pitfalls, such as catalog-signed Windows drivers that look unsigned on another machine.
How to check a host
Offline, from an image or a collection:
- List every service with
Type1 or 2 in the control set thatSelect\Currentnames. Flag images outsideSystem32\driversandSystem32\DriverStore\FileRepository, vendor utility drivers on machines that do not need them, and keys written during the intrusion window. - Collect the files those services name and any
.sysin writable folders. Read signer, version information and hashes withsigcheck -i -h -a, then compare file and Authenticode hashes with LOLDrivers and the downloadable blocklist. - Match Amcache's
InventoryDriverBinarySHA-1 values against the same lists: they survive deletion of the file. - Line up 7045, 7000 and the CodeIntegrity events. A 3023 or 3077 for a vendor driver means the blocklist or another policy refused it: the attempt is evidence even when it failed.
- Read the blocklist and memory integrity values in the hive.
Live, from an elevated prompt:
Get-CimInstance Win32_SystemDriver | Select-Object Name, State, StartMode, PathName
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName = 'System'; Id = 7045, 7000 } -MaxEvents 200 | Format-List TimeCreated, Id, Message
Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational' -MaxEvents 500 | Where-Object Id -in 3023, 3033, 3076, 3077
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CI\Config -Name VulnerableDriverBlocklistEnable -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard -Namespace root\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard | Select-Object SecurityServicesRunning
sigcheck64.exe -accepteula -nobanner -s -e -h -i C:\ProgramData
In a memory image, Volatility 3's windows.modules, windows.modscan and windows.unloadedmodules show drivers that are loaded or were recently unloaded, including one whose service and file are already gone.
Limits: a key, a file or a 7045 event shows installation, not what the driver was used for; absence from LOLDrivers or the blocklist does not make a driver benign; once kernel memory has been changed, live listings may be filtered. Capture memory before rebooting.
What the checker looks for
The windrivers module reads the SYSTEM hive, the .sys files in the collection, Amcache and the System and CodeIntegrity logs. For BYOVD it raises:
- "A known vulnerable driver (LOLDrivers)" when a file's SHA-256, SHA-1, MD5 or Authenticode hash matches its LOLDrivers snapshot, whatever the file is called; high severity when a driver service points to the file. The snapshot holds entries named
dbutil_2_3.sys,ene.sys,vboxdrv.sys,dbk64.sys,aswarpot.sysandrtcore64.sys. Amcache SHA-1 values are matched too, so a deleted driver can still be named; - "A driver service loads its image from" a writable folder, "A driver file in a writable folder" and "Amcache lists a driver in a writable folder";
- a name one character away from a LOLDrivers or Windows driver name, and a driver service key written shortly before the newest activity on the host;
- the 7045, 7000 and 7026 events, and the CodeIntegrity refusals: 3023 under App Control, 3076 and 3077 policy blocks, 3032, 3036 and 3112 revocations;
- "Memory integrity (HVCI) is turned off in the registry".
A valid vendor signature raises nothing on its own: that is what BYOVD looks like. The module does not read VulnerableDriverBlocklistEnable, does not hold Microsoft's blocklist, and checks embedded signatures without a trust store or revocation list. It cannot see what was done with the driver, and nothing of FudModule's later zero-day versions, which brought no driver.
Mitigation and recovery
- The vulnerable driver blocklist. Microsoft states that since the Windows 11 2022 update (version 22H2) the blocklist "is enabled by default for all devices", and that, except on Windows Server 2016, it is also enforced when memory integrity (HVCI), Smart App Control or S mode is active. It is updated quarterly and through monthly updates. Microsoft warns that it "isn't guaranteed to block every driver" and that the downloadable version is usually more complete than the built-in one; apply that version through App Control for Business where you can.
- Memory integrity (HVCI). It moves kernel code integrity decisions into the VBS environment and, on supported versions, enforces the blocklist. It is on by default on many new Windows 11 devices.
- Attack surface reduction. The rule "Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers" stops applications from writing such drivers to disk; Microsoft notes it does not stop a driver already present from loading.
- Fewer administrators. Loading a driver needs administrative rights, so BYOVD always follows a compromise that reached them.
Recovery: capture memory first, since kernel changes made through the driver vanish at reboot. Preserve the service key, file and logs, then remove the service and file. The driver was a tool: find out what was done with kernel access, which security products were disabled and how the attacker became an administrator. Rebuild the host rather than trust a cleaned one, and rotate the credentials it held.
Sources
Primary public reports, newest first.
- 2026-10-21Enable memory integrityMicrosoft
- 2026-05-01Microsoft recommended driver block rulesMicrosoft
- 2025-10-24Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)MITRE ATT&CK
- 2025-03-07When the absence of noise becomes signal: defensive considerations for Lazarus FudModuleIBM X-Force
- 2024-02-28Lazarus and the FudModule Rootkit: Beyond BYOVD with an Admin-to-Kernel Zero-DayAvast
- 2023-02-11LOLDrivers: Living Off The Land DriversLOLDrivers project
- 2022-10-04BlackByte ransomware returnsSophos
- 2022-09-30Amazon-themed campaigns of Lazarus in the Netherlands and BelgiumESET
- 2022-09-22Analysis Report on Lazarus Group's Rootkit Attack Using BYOVDAhnLab
- 2022-02-23(Ex)Change of Pace: UNC2596 Observed Leveraging Vulnerabilities to Deploy Cuba RansomwareMandiant
- 2021-09-30GhostEmperor: From ProxyLogon to kernel modeKaspersky
- 2018-09-27LoJax: First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit groupESET
- 2014-03-07Uroburos: Deeper travel into kernel protection mitigationG DATA
See also
Related techniques
- Driver signature enforcement tamperingGetting into the kernel
- Malicious drivers with valid signaturesGetting into the kernel
- Removing kernel notification callbacksBlinding defences
- Direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM)Hiding
Families that use it
- DemodexWindows kernel rootkit
- FudModuleWindows kernel rootkit
- POORTRY / BURNTCIGARMalicious or abused driver
- SnakeWindows kernel rootkit